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STATE O F UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 950715-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

M A X L, S M I T H ,
D e f e n d a n t A p p e 1 J d 11L

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT QF AE PEALS
This Court has appellate iu!isdiction in this matter
pursuant

Louie:

"

*'

Code A i 11 i o t a t e d S e c t i 01 )

78-2a-3(2)f).

ISSUES PRESENTED A N D STANDARDS O F REVIEW
]

Wh e t he r t h e t r i a 1 c o u r t abu s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n

r e f u s i n g t o a c c e p t t h e s t i p u 1 a t i o i I o f 1: h e p a r t i e s w h i c 1: I w o u 1 d
b i f u r c a t e t h e issue of S m i t h ' s three pri or c o n v i c t i o n s f o r
Driv:i i Ig I Ji ider 11 Ie 11 if J i Ience?
557

See St.a. te \i

J ai i: tes , / ' 6 i I 2d 54 9,

(Utah 1989) (relying o n State v. Saunders,, 699 P. 2d 7 3 9 (Utah

] 98 5) ) .
This issue w a s p r e s e r v e d i n a m o t i o n by t h e p a r t i e s m a d e
i m m e d i a t e ! y p r i o r to t h e t r i a l ' s c o m m e n c e m e n t

1

(R. 1 4 7 - 1 5 0 ) .

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(7) (a) (1994 Supp.)
A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation
committed within six years of the prior violations
under this section is a third degree felony if at least
three prior convictions are for violations committed
after April 23, 1990.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Max L. Smith appeals from the judgment, sentence and

commitment imposed by the Honorable Guy R. Burningham on
September 27, 1995, after a jury trial at which Smith was
convicted of Driving under the Influence, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Smith was charged by information filed on or about January

18, 1995, with Driving Under the Influence, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44 (1995
Supp.) (R. 9 ) 1 . A preliminary hearing was conducted on January
26, 1995 (R. 7-8), after which Smith was bound-over to the Fourth
District Court where they entered a plea of "not guilty" at
arraignment (R. 11, 16).

'Smith was also charged with Driving on Revocation, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-136.
Smith, however, does not challenge that conviction on appeal.

2

On May 22, 1995, a jury trial was held in Fourth District
Court, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham presiding, wherein Smith
convicted (R. 145-355) .

Smith moved the trial court for an

Arrest of Judgment on May 31, 1995 (R. 101-106); and that motion
was denied by Order signed on July 17, 1995 (R. 124)

On

September 27, 1995, Judge Burningham sentenced Smith to threeyears probation (R. 132-134, 356-368) and this appeal followed
(R. 139).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On May 22, 1995, a jury trial was conducted in Fourth
District Court, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham presiding, at
which Smith was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, a third
degree felony (R. 145-355) .
Prior to the beginning of trial, the parties gave notice to
the trial court of their intent to enter a stipulation on the
record which would bifurcate the proceedings and preclude the
introduction of evidence of Smith's three/four prior DUI
convictions until after the jury's deliberation on the charged
offense in order to avoid the introduction of evidence which is
more prejudicial than probative (R. 147). Then, if Smith was
convicted by the jury of the charged offense minus the element of
three prior convictions, Smith would waive the jury relative to
the "prior convictions" element of the offense and the State

3

would present evidence of the prior convictions to the trial
court (R. 147-48). 2
The trial court refused to accept the stipulation stating
that "I tried that once in another county and found that it was
quite burdensome and confusing to the jury" (R. 148). The trial
court added thatf because the prior convictions constitute a
necessary element of the charged offense, "I'm going to require
that it be done according to the statute, rather than try to
bifurcate it" (R. 148-49).
During trial, the jury was informed of Smith's prior
convictions (R. 168-69, 258, 327) and was instructed prior to
deliberation that the prior convictions were an essential element
of the charged offense (R.84, 85 (Instruction Nos. 2 and 3)). In
addition, the verdict form given to the jury required a finding
of either "Guilty" or "Not Guilty" (R. 88). Smith was
subsequently convicted by the jury (R. 88, 352-54).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Smith asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to accept the parties' stipulation to bifurcated

2

In fact, the State advocated for a bifurcated procedure in its
proposed jury instructions and verdict form (R. 25-56).
For
example, in the instruction setting forth the charge as contained
in the criminal information and in the instruction breaking-down
the essential elements of the offense, all references to prior
convictions were removed (R. 53, 54). Likewise, in the State's
proposed verdict form, the jury would be instructed to find either
"The facts alleged have been proven" or "The facts alleged have not
been proven" (R. 25) (emphasis in original) .

4

proceedings.

Utah courts have repeatedly found that in cases

where prior convictions are an element of the charged offense,
proceedings should be bifurcated, absent contrary legislative
guidance, unless such convictions are competent to establish
defendant's culpability for the offense for which he is then on
trial.

Moreover, a trial court's failure to bifurcate in such a

case is reversible error for which prejudice is generally
presumed.

In this case, evidence of Smith's prior-DUI

convictions could not establish that Smith was driving under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the alleged offense.
Therefore, it was prejudicial error constituting an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to refuse to bifurcate the
proceedings.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO BIFURCATE THE PROCEEDINGS AS REQUESTED BY BOTH
COUNSEL FOR THE STATE AND COUNSEL FOR SMITH
Immediately prior to the commencement of Smith's trial, the
trial court was presented with a proposed stipulation by the
parties which would bifurcate the proceedings and prohibit the
introduction of evidence of Smith's prior DUI convictions until
the jury had convicted Smith of the other elements of the current
DUI charge (R. 147-48) .

The purpose of the stipulation was to

5

avoid the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence to the jury
prior to their examination of the elements relating solely to the
incident which formed the basis of the current charge (R. 147).
The trial court refused the request to bifurcate the
proceedings because it would be "quite burdensome and confusing
to the jury" (R. 148); and because the prior convictions
constituted a necessary element of the charged felony-DUI
offense.
During trial, the jury was informed of Smith's prior
convictions (R. 168-69, 258, 327) and Smith was subsequently
found "guilty" of the charged offense (R. 88, 352-54).
Smith asserts that the trial court abused its discretion,
and committed reversible error, in its refusal to bifurcate the
evidence of Smith's prior-DUI convictions from evidence related
exclusively to the commission of the charged DUI.
In State v. Stewart, 171 P.2d 383 (Utah 1946), the Utah
Supreme Court outlined a bifurcated procedure to be followed by
trial courts in DUI cases which involve prior-DUI convictions and
purport to impose a greater punishment for a subsequent DUI
offense.

The purpose of this procedure, in the absence of

legislative direction, was to "properly expedite the adjudication
of such cases, while at the same time safeguard[ing] the
substantial rights of accused persons and to prevent an accused
person from being advertised to the jury as one who previously

6

perpetrated a similar type of offense.'' Stewart, 171 P.2d at 386.
This procedure was instigated by the Court "in view of the
prejudicial nature of the evidence of prior conviction as such
evidence bears on proof of commission of the substantive
offense."

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court then adopted the bifurcated procedure
utilized by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Ferrone,
113 A. 452, a habitual criminal case: In the absence of statutory
regulation, the information should be divided into two parts.
The first detailing the elements of the current offense; and the
second, alleging the existence of prior convictions.
111 P.2d at 387 (quoting Ferrone, 113 A. at457).

Stewart,

The jury should

initially receive and deliberate only on the first part of the
information,

id.

Then if the jury returns a verdict of "guilty"

on the substantive offense, then they should be given the second
part of the information and "should be charged to inquire on that
issue."

Id.

In addition, the Utah Court quoted and adopted language from
Ferrone which allows the defendant to plead guilty to the second
part of the information so that further proceedings with the jury
are not necessary, or the defendant could choose to submit the
second issue of prior convictions to the court and not the jury,

id.

7

Accordingly, the Stewart Court held that because "the prior
convictions could not properly be considered by the jury in
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the
substantive offense," it was "reversible error to permit evidence
thereof to be presented to the jury in the trial of that issue."
Stewart, 171 P.2d at 386.

Furthermore, Utah courts have

repeatedly affirmed that "evidence of prior crimes is generally
presumed prejudicial and that 'absent a reason for the admission
of the evidence other than to show criminal disposition, the
evidence is excluded.'" State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah
1989).
In James, the Utah Supreme Court exercised its "inherent
supervisory power over trial courts" and adopted a bifurcated
procedure in the context of first degree murder under Utah Code
Annotated Section 76-5-202(1) (h) which would preclude
presentation of defendant's prior conviction until a finding of
guilt on the current killing.

James, 767 at 557.

Accord,

State

v. F^ore?, 777 P.2d 452 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
439, 494-99 (Utah 1988) (separate opinion of Zimmerman, J . ) .
also,

See

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) (Trial court

abused its discretion in refusing to sever burglary and theft
charges from possession of firearm charge for which evidence of a
prior conviction was admissible).
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Likewise, in this case the statute is devoid of any guidance
from the legislature as to the procedures to be used in felonyDUI proceedings.

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(7) (1993)

simply states that a "fourth or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of the prior violations. . .
is a third degree felony" that is subject to a greater penalty.
Moreover, like the scenarios in Stewart and Ferronef "until a
verdict has been rendered on the principal offense, there is no
occasion to mention the prior convictions since previous offenses
would not be competent to prove that defendant committed the
offense for which he is then on trial."
387.

Stewart, 171 P.2d at

In other words, evidence of Smith's prior-DUI convictions

is incompetent to prove that, on the occasion resulting in the
current offense, Smith was driving under the influence of
alcohol.

Accordingly, prejudice to Smith which resulted from the

jury's knowledge of the prior convictions should be presumed; and
this Court should conclude that the trial court, in refusing to
bifurcate the proceedings as requested by the parties, abused its
discretion.

9

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the trial courtfs failure to bifurcate the
proceedings as required by established precedent, Smith asks this
Court to reverse his conviction on grounds that he was prejudiced
by the jury's knowledge of his previous DUI convictions prior to
deliberation on the current, substantive offense.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

\1

day of January, 1997.

Margareyt P. Lindsay f,
J
Counsel for Smith
ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary in this brief pursuant to Rule
24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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